What’s going on with Kosovo and Serbia?
What’s going on with Kosovo and Serbia?
As a ‘justified political reaction to Serbia’s hostility’, Kosovo has raised import taxes on Serbian and Bosnian products, with the Serbian Trade Minister proclaiming the move ‘will halt any trade between Serbia and Kosovo’ and the Albanian Prime Minister calling it a ‘silent political reaction and an invitation for Serbia to stand with its feet on the ground, because the path to the future cannot be built with a knife in the back of Albanians’.
When Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, it became the seventh country to emerge from the ruins of Yugoslavia. Around ninety percent of the population are ethnically Albanian and generally Muslim, while fewer than one in ten is a Serb and generally Orthodox Christian, though the reverse is true in the Serb-dominated region of North Kosovo.
The tensions which ultimately led to the horrific Yugoslav wars of the 1990s had come to the boil following the death of Yugoslav leader Tito in 1980. Albanians in Kosovo, Slovenia, and Croatia demanded greater autonomy from Serbia, while the Serbs demanded more authority, and reacted with force upon the latter two’s declarations of independence in 1991. The individual conflicts in each country lasted anything from ten days to five years over the following decade and eventually led to the complete break-up of Yugoslavia.
After the Balkan Wars and the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, it became a UN protectorate — a separate and self-governing state under UN administration but still politically part of Serbia. In 2008, its government unilaterally declared its independence, rendering moot a process establishing a ‘final status’ for Kosovo begun by the UN administration in 2005. While Kosovar independence may have been recognised by the United States, the United Kingdom, and over 100 other countries, Kosovo has not been admitted to the UN. Russia, despite citing the example of Kosovo to justify its annexation of Crimea in 2014, China, which has a long history of standing up for territorial integrity, and Spain, whose own problems with independence movements are well publicised, are particularly reluctant to recognise its independence. Serbia is the least happy of all.
The Kosovo government promised to protect the rights of its Serbian minority, and Serbia in return said it would not take military action to regain the region. But while the European Union has mediated many talks between Kosovo and Serbia in the last eight years, resulting in the as-yet unimplemented 2013 Brussels Agreement, nothing concrete has been achieved and tensions remain—though, crucially, Serbia has accepted that concrete progress is a pre-requisite for its EU accession negotiations. Serbia fears for the safety of the Serbs living in Kosovo and for the many important historic, cultural and religious sites there.
Much has happened between the two countries in Kosovo’s ten years of independence: Serbia agreed to prosecute the perpetrators of the war crimes against Kosovo, but hasn’t done so; it also refuses to parse through its war records to locate the bodies of the missing Kosovar soldiers. Kosovo agreed to form an Association of Serbian Municipalities with Serbia wanting that association to follow Serbian law—this was deemed a violation of Kosovo’s sovereignty and dissolved.
Red states recognise Kosovo as an independent nation, while the blue states recognise the Province of Kosovo as part of Serbia.
The previous few years have seen increased dialogue and cooperation between the two governments, with Serbia agreeing to refrain from lobbying against Kosovo joining international organisations, having previously prevented it from joining UNESCO, Interpol and various sporting bodies. Kosovo needs UNESCO’s help in education and conservation of important heritage sites; they need to be part of Interpol because Kosovo sits in the middle of the route linking the East and the West and needs cooperation to tackle organised crime and terrorism; and if you can’t join international sporting bodies you can’t compete as a Kosovar athlete. Yet, despite agreeing to cease opposing Kosovo joining said organisations, Serbia — and Russia, which possesses a veto on these matters at their earliest stage — continue to oppose any initiative by the government of Kosovo joining UN agencies.
This year, tensions have begun to rise again: prominent Kosovo-Serb politician, Oliver Ivanovic, was killed, with Kosovo-Serbs accusing the Kosovo-Albanians of murder and hiding evidence; Serbian politician Marko Duric was arrested at gunpoint when he entered Mitrovica, despite being banned from entering Kosovo for ‘encouraging hatred’; Serbian President Vucic referred to the Kosovar state and police as terrorists.
Then, on November 20, Kosovo failed to receive the two-third majority vote necessary to join Interpol; by joining, Kosovo would be able to request ‘red notices’ demanding the arrest of Serbian officials considered by Kosovo to be war criminals—seen as a key concern for Serbia. Within 24 hours of their failed attempt to join, Kosovo raised import tariffs on Serbian and Bosnian goods from 10 percent to 100 percent, and Kosovar Deputy Prime Minister Enver Hoxhaj explicitly referenced Serbia’s ‘aggressive campaign against Kosovo on the international stage’ as justification for the move.
The ‘silent political reaction’ also requires authorities to prevent any good entering Kosovo without addressing it by its constitutional name—the Republic of Kosovo—which, of course, Serbia doesn’t recognise. The European Union is rather unimpressed with the move too, with Foreign Policy chief Federica Mogherini saying the decision ‘is a clear violation of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and the spirit of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo’ and demanding Kosovo immediately revoke the decision. Kosovo says the measures will remain in place until ‘Serbia recognises Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state’.
After all, the European Union can put as much pressure as it wants on Kosovo — but Kosovo is in the unique position of being able to ignore that: Kosovo has no credible EU membership perspective so long as five EU member states refuse to recognise its independence, and has recently had its visa liberalisation process postponed to 2020 (meaning no visa-free travel to the Schengen Area for Kosovar citizens)—Kosovo is not happy with the treatment it has received from EU institutions and appears to see little reason to play ball.
It seems the two Balkan countries are entering into a new conflict, this time armed with trade tariffs and customs officers, rather than rifles and landmines. Such trade wars are hardly unfamiliar to Europe but Kosovo represents an aberration. Since the end of the Balkan wars and Kosovo’s subsequent secession, the country has been inundated with Western intervention and influence—building a new country illustrates the power the West has, illustrates its benevolence in accepting and transforming a post-communist, war-battered nation into a democratic, free-market, independent state. Various organisations have peppered Kosovo with goodwill while demanding it meet evermore stringent requirements, standards and benchmarks—the West has made its expectations of the new country known, and Kosovo appears to have had enough.
The new customs duties may well be a flagrant violation of CEFTA and the agreements made between the EU and Kosovo, but can we blame a country for standing up for itself when demands have increased and returns have diminished?
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